This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defense purposes only; that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection as such information is afforded by the United States; that it is not to be revealed to another country or international organization without the written consent of the United States Government department or agency furnishing the information.

"Intellectual Center of the Army"

Opening Remarks

Presented to:

Counterinsurgency Conference

27 October 2009

USA/USMC COIN Center
U.S. Army Stability Operations Proponent
U.S Army Security Force Assistance Proponent
COL Chad LeMay, Deputy Director

COIN Center Origin & Mission

- **Founded Summer 06 – GEN Petraeus and Gen Mattis, USMC**
- **Assist with FM 3-24 Integration and Implementation**
- **"Connect the Dots"**

Mission Statement: USA/USMC COIN Center provides oversight of ground force COIN integration in order to improve US ground forces' capability to operate in a full spectrum/COIN environment:

- ***Integrate COIN initiatives***
- ***Research best practices***
- ***Improve Doctrine***
- ***Improve Education***
- ***Advise leaders and organizations***
- ***Conduct Outreach to other military & civilian entities***

Lines of Effort

Assist Army/USMC in implementation/application of the body of thought in FM 3-24

Global COIN Center Partners

Land Force Doctrine and Training System

War College

Special Operations Forces School

UK Land Warfare Centre

COIN Centers for Excellence

COIN and Stability Operations Center

COIN Training Center–Afghanistan

UK: Land Stability and COIN Centre

NATO: Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

Netherlands: Doctrine

France: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre



Poland: Joint Force Training Centre

Liaison Officer Integration

Japan

Netherlands

Brazil

Italy

Australia

New Zealand

France

United Kingdom

Media

- *National Public Radio*
- *McClatchy*
- *Chicago Tribune*
- *Congressional Quarterly*

U.S. Military Centers

- *USA/USMC COIN Center*
- *USJFCOM Joint Irregular Warfare Center*
- *SOCOM J10*
- *USMC Irregular Warfare Center*
- *USAF Irregular Warfare Center*
- *USCENTCOM Interagency Task Force*
- *Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance*

U.S. Government

- *State/Coordinator for*
- *U.S. Agency for International Development*
- *Department of Justice*
- *National Security Council*

Think Tanks

- *RAND*
- *U.S. Institute of Peace*
- *Center for New American Security*
- *Small Wars Journal*

Academia

- *Harvard*
- *US Military Academy*
- *Johns Hopkins*
- *Princeton*
- *Stanford*
- *Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute*

COIN Center Contributions to CAC



Where TRADOC fits within the Army



Where CAC fits within TRADOC



Note: Army Accessions Command (AAC) executes TRADOC LoO #1: ***Human Capital***

CAC's Organization



COIN/SO/SFA Center Organization



14 Military
1 Civilian
5 Contr

SO & SFA Proponent Direction

Vision

Premier military institution for development
nd integration of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmenta
tinational stability operations & security force assista
expertise and capability development

Goals

Body of thought in FM 3-07 and FM 3-07.1 *operationalized* in Ground forces

Comprehensive Approach

Expanded joint and multi-national coordination

Objectives

SO & SFA Doctrine and applicable tasks / learning objectives integrated into PME and institutional training.

Shared understanding of capabilities and limitations of other government agencies and how each contribute to successful whole of government efforts.

Established coordination means to pass lessons, observations and insights and improve interoperability amongst partners.

http://coin.army.mil

COUNTERINSURGENCY, SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE, STABILITY OPERATIONS WEBSITE

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Knowledge Center
Leaders' Workshop
Research
Colloquium
Public Affairs
Events

TALIBAN ARE THE ONLY WINNERS OF THE AFGHAN ELECTION

Wednesday, September 23, 2009 10:13:00 AM



TALIBAN ARE THE ONLY WINNERS OF THE AFGHAN ELECTION

idential election and istration, it seemed hree courses of

he election tively targeting the election process, by attacking electoral workers and the movement of electoral materials.

- **COA 2:** Overtly disrupt the election process by attacking voters and polling centers on Election Day.

- **COA 3:** Ignore the whole process and count on voter apathy and lack of government effectiveness to demonstrate to the people that, elections or no elections, western style democracy was just not working and had, to date, and, in the future, would make no difference in the lives of Afghans because in spite of great expectations in 2005 it had not made a difference in the last five years.

COIN Leader Workshop 27-29 Oct 09

Virtual Brown Bag 20 Nov 09 UAVs in COIN